Many hash-based authentication protocols have been proposed, and proven secure assuming that underlying hash functions are secure. On the other hand, if a hash function compromises, the security of authentication protocols based on this hash function becomes unclear. Therefore, it is significantly important to verify the security of hash-based protocols when a hash function is broken.
Introduction
Authentication is the act of confirming someone or something, such as the identity of a person or the integrity of a message. The authentication action is indispensable, especially when the two interacting parties are communicating with each other through Network. One popular approach to design an authentication protocols is utilizing a hash function. Hash function compresses arbitrary-length messages into fixed-length short random values. The hash-based authentication protocols have been proven secure based on the assumption that the underlying hash functions are secure. On the other hand, if a dedicated hash function compromises, the security of the authentication protocols based on this hash function will become unclear. Therefore, it is significantly important to verify the security of the hash-based † † The author is with NTT Information Sharing Platform Laboratories, NTT Corporation, Musashino-shi, 180-8585 Japan.
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Recently cryptographers pay a lot of attention to cryptanalysis of hash functions. Weakness of many hash functions has been revealed [14] , [15] . It leads to the necessity of re-analyzing the hash-based protocols implemented with a dedicated hash function, which compromised. This is the main motivation of our research.
One of the most popular hash functions is MD5, which was broken in 2005 [14] . We will deal with two authentication protocols based on MD5: APOP [8] and NMAC [1] .
APOP is an authentication command for the server to authenticate the users in the Post Office Protocol Version 3 (POP3) [8] , which is implemented for a local user to retrieve his emails from a remote server over the Internet channel. Interestingly, quoting to [8] , APOP is defined with MD5 as its underlying hash function.
NMAC, proposed in [1] , does not have any application. However, its variant HMAC (Keyed-Hashing for Message Authentication Code), proposed in [1] , has been applied in many protocols such as TLS (Transport Layer Security) and IPSec (Internet Protocol Security). MD5-based HMAC (HMAC-MD5 for simplicity) has been standardized and implemented in many Internet protocols. We stress that the security of NMAC is the foundation of the security of HMAC: the security proof of HMAC is based on the assumption that NMAC is secure [1] , [2] . If MD5-based NMAC (NMAC-MD5 for simplicity) is insecure, the security proof of HMAC-MD5 will collapse. Consequently the security of the protocols based on HMAC-MD5 will become unclear. Therefore cryptanalysis of NMAC-MD5 is significantly important, even though it does not have any practical application.
Our Results
We will attack APOP and NMAC-MD5 by utilizing the weakness of MD5.
For APOP, we will propose a modified password recovery attack. Previous password recovery attacks are chosenchallenge attacks, which impersonate the server to send chosen challenges to the user. Our attack procedure adopts the same strategy and scenario. Our main contribution is half-reducing the number of necessary impersonations. Namely our attack is twice as faster as previous attacks [7] , [10] , [11] . Moreover, during impersonating the server, the attack has a risk of being detected. Therefore reducing the number of impersonations will lower the probability of the attack being detected, which makes the attack more realistic. For NMAC-MD5, there are two secret keys: the inner key and the outer key. Our main contribution is a new attack procedure to recover the outer key. By combining previous inner-key recovery attack [4] , we can obtain a new full-key recovery attack on NMAC-MD5. Our attack can recover the full key within 2 75 online queries and 2 75 offline MD5 computations, while previous attack needs 2 28 online queries and 2 100 offline MD5 computations [6] . Following the evaluation method of the total complexity in [4] , which is the sum of online queries and offline complexity, the complexity of our attack is 2 76 , while that of previous attack is 2 100 . Of independent interest, our outer-key recovery attack can recover the outer key without the knowledge of the inner key. Finally we emphasize that our attack reveals a new weakness of NMAC-MD5, which is based on the feed-forward operation in compression function of MD5. Many other hash functions such as SHA-1 have similar structure. Therefore our attack procedure might be applicable to SHA-1-based NMAC.
Related Previous Attacks
For APOP, Leurent published a password recovery attack [7] by utilizing Wang et al.'s collision attacks on MD5 [14] , which can recover 3 password characters. This was independently found by Sasaki et al. [10] . Sasaki et al. published an improved password recovery attack [11] by utilizing Den Boer et al.'s collision attack on MD5 [3] , which can recover 31 password characters. For NMAC, Contini et al. proposed an inner-key-recovery attack on NMAC based on several hash functions including MD5 [4] . Fouque et al. proposed an outer-key-recovery attack on NMAC with several hash functions including MD5, which can be extended to a full-key-recovery attack by combining [4] .
Background and Related Works
2.1 MD5 and Related Attacks on MD5 2.1.1 MD5 Algorithm MD5 [9] follows Merkle-Damgård structure. An input message M will be padded and divided into 512-bit blocks {M 1 , . . . , M l }. The padding rule is first adding a single '1' and the minimum number of '0's until the bit length becomes 448 on modulo 512, and then adding the bit length of original M to the last 64 bits. The message blocks will be hashed sequentially by a primitive usually described as compression function. Hereafter we will denote by md5 the compression function of MD5. md5 is a mapping function: 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15) 
where m k is one of (m 0 , . . . , m 15 ), t is a constant defined at each step, ≪ s i means a left-rotation by s i bits, and f is a Boolean function depending on the round. The details of these parameters are shown in Table 1 . The final output is as follows:
Collision Attacks on Md5
A collision attack on md5 has been proposed by Den Boer and Bosselaers in [3] : md5(h, M)=md5(h , M), where the differences only exist between h and h . Moreover, the difference between h and h has a special form. From the specification of md5, h and h will be divided into (a 0 , b 0 , c 0 , d 0 ) and (a 0 , b 0 , c 0 , d 0 ) respectively. The differences between h and h have to satisfy
0x80000000, 0x80000000, 0x80000000, 0x80000000), which will be denoted as Δ MS B hereafter for simplicity. Moreover, the MSBs of b 0 , c 0 and d 0 should be equal.
For random h and M, the probability that 
IV Bridge
Collision attacks on md5 in Sect. 2.1.2 can not be trivially extended to attack MD5. The main reason is that IV of MD5 [11] , which has been detailed in Appendix A. We will utilize their IV bridge for improving the previous attacks on APOP.
Tunnel Technique
Klima proposed a technique named Tunnel [5] , which can speed up searching collisions on MD5. Here we will only describe "Q9 Tunnel", which will be used in our improved attacks on APOP.
Q9 tunnel, detailed in Table 2 , is a local collision inside md5 from the 8-th step until the 12-th step: for any m 8 at the 8-th step, there are corresponding m 9 and m 12 that make the intermediate chaining variables at the 12-th step remain the same. Moreover, m 8 , m 9 and m 12 locate at steps 28, 25 and 32 in the second round respectively. Therefore all the intermediate chaining variables from the 12-th step until the 24-th step will also remain the same. During searching a collision on md5, by setting Q9 tunnel, after a message satisfying all the conditions from the first step until the 24-th step is found, we will change its m 8 freely, then adaptively compute m 9 and m 12 without breaking the intermediate chaining variables until the 24-th step. For more details, refer to [5] .
APOP and Related Attacks on APOP

APOP
APOP is a MD5-based challenge and response authentication protocol, which is used in POP3 [8] by mail servers to authenticate users. The procedure of APOP is detailed as follows.
1. The user sends an access request to the server. 2. The server sends a random challenge to the user. 3. The user sends a MD5 hash digest MD5(IV, challenge||password) to the server, where || means concatenation. 4. The server performs the same calculation on his side to obtain another MD5 hash digest, and then checks whether the two MD5 digests match. 5. If the two digests are the same, authentication succeeds. Otherwise, authentication fails.
Password Recovery Attacks on APOP
Password recovery attacks on APOP [7] , [10] , [11] are chosen-challenge attacks. The attacker impersonates the server and sends chosen challenges to the user. The main novelty of the previous password recovery attack is recovering the former part of the password following the exhaustively guess-then-verify approach without the knowledge of the latter part. Consequently, the attacker can recover the password one part by one part sequentially, and the complexity will be significantly lower than the expected complexity.
Denote the password by P 1 || · · · ||P l , where P i is one part of password. Suppose the attacker has recovered P 1 , . . ., P i−2 and P i−1 (i ≤ l). The high-level description of recovering P i is as follows.
1. Guess the value of P i . 2. Generate a pair of challenges (C, C ) satisfying the following three conditions. a. C and C have the same bit length; b. the length of
Here MD5 computation is without padding the messages.
From the specification of MD5, these three conditions guarantee that MD5(IV, C||P)=MD5(IV, C ||P) no matter what P i+1 , · · ·, P l are. 3. Send C to the user to obtain a response R. 4. Send C to the user to obtain a response R . 5. If R = R , the current guess value is the true P i . 6. If R R , change the guess value, and go to step 2.
Suppose P i has n bits. There are 2 n possible candidates for P i . As a result, steps 2∼6 will be repeated 2 n times in the worst case. So the bit length of P i should be as short as possible. From the specification of APOP [8] , the length of challenges must be a multiple of 8. Therefore, the minimum bit length of P i is 8, namely, one character. So previous APOP attacks [7] , [10] , [11] recover the password characters one by one. For one password character, 2 8 −1 pairs of challenges are necessary in the worst case (the attacker does not need to confirm the last candidate if all the other candidates have been proven wrong). 
where k 1 and k 2 are denoted as the outer key and the inner key respectively.
Previous Key-Recovery Attacks on NMAC-MD5
Previous key-recovery attacks on NMAC-MD5 [4] , [6] are in the related-key setting, which means that the attacker is given other NMAC-MD5 oracles with different keys, and the relations between the keys in different oracles are known. Denote by MD5(k 1 , MD5(k 2 , ·)) the target oracle. The attacker first recovers the inner key k 2 by utilizing another oracle MD5(k 1 , MD5(k 2 ⊕ Δ MS B , ·)) [4] , and then recovers the outer key k 1 by utilizing the inner key k 2 and another oracle MD5(k 1 ⊕Δ MS B , MD5(k 2 , ·)) [6] . The procedure of recovering k 1 and of recovering k 2 are similar. How to recover k b (b ∈ {1, 2}) is as follows: 
Improving the Previous Attacks on APOP
At first, we will show two problems of the previous password recovery attacks on APOP and point out one plausible approach. Then we will introduce a new variant of collision on hash function and apply it to MD5. Finally we illustrate our improved attack on APOP.
Two Problems of the Previous Attacks
Problem I: APOP is Triggered by the User
From the specification of APOP, APOP can not be executed unless the user sends access requests first. Therefore the attacker impersonating the server can not send chosen challenges unless the user sends access requests, which will make the time complexity of the previous attacks depend on the number of chosen challenges and the frequency of the user sending requests. Pick one password character as an example. The number of necessary chosen challenges is 510 in the worst case. Suppose the user checks new emails once per hour. The time complexity is at least 510 hours in the worst case. Reducing the number of necessary chosen challenges will improve the time complexity. Reducing the number of necessary chosen challenges will reduce the number of impersonations, which will lower the probability of the attack being detected. This improvement will make the attack on APOP more realistic.
A Variant of Collisions on Hash Functions: Applied to MD5
Bit-Free Collision
Definition 1. If a pair of partially-fixed messages (M, M ) satisfies the following conditions † , it is denoted as a bit-free collision on a hash function H:
M and M have the same bit-length. 2. the unfixed bits of M and of M have the same bit positions, and are equal. 3. any pair of messages, derived by setting the value of the unfixed bits of M and M , will be a collision on H.
where the unfixed bits are denoted as free bits. Denote by t-bit-free collision a bit-free collision with tfree bits for simplicity. 2 t pairs of colliding messages can be derived from a t-bit-free collision. So a t-bit-free collision is a set of 2 t colliding message pairs. Note that the collision pairs differ from each other at the bit values of the t-free bits. For any two messages from different pairs, namely with different bit values at the t-free bits, the probability that they contribute to a collision is negligible.
To make the definition clear, we will pick a 1-bit-free collision (M, M ) as an example. M and M have the same bit-length, and have one same bit position (the free bit), where the value is not fixed. By setting the free bit to 0, a pair of messages (M 0 , M 0 ) is derived from (M, M ). By setting the free bit to 1, a pair of messages (M 1 , M 1 ) is derived from (M, M ). Both (M 0 , M 0 ) and (M 1 , M 1 ) are collisions on H. The probability that (M 0 , M 1 ) or (M 0 , M 1 ) is a collision on H is negligible. † The conditions are restrictive. In fact we can give more general definition for bit-free collision. For example, conditions 1 and 2 are not necessary. Since this paper deals with the application to attacking APOP, we define the bit-free collision according to this application for the consistency.
Bit-Free Collision Attack on MD5
Our bit-free collision attack on MD5 adopts the collision attack on md5 in Sect. There are 9 conditions from the 16-th step until the 24-th step. By using the Q9 tunnel technique, if one message can satisfy all these 9 conditions, 2 31 messages can be derived from it that each can satisfy these 9 conditions. There are 23 conditions from the 25-th step to the 64-th step. It seems that finding a 1-bit-free collision with a complexity roughly 2 46 is practical. We implement the 1-bitfree collision search. Surprisingly, it takes only 12 hours by 12 computers on average to generate a 1-bit-free collision, which is much faster than the usual time for the 2 46 md5 computations. One reason is that the complexity calculated by counting the number of the conditions is greater than the precise complexity. Moreover, due to the biased bit position of the conditions, since all the conditions are located in only MSB of the intermediate chaining values, the complexity should be less than the 2 46 md5 computations. One example of a 1-bit-free collision on MD5 is shown in Appendix.
3.3 Our Improved Attack on APOP
The Main Novelty
We will recover each password character part by part as follows: first locate the free bit in the target password character, then recover the 7-non-free bits by the guess-then-verify approach using the 1-bit-free collisions on MD5, and finally recover the free bit by the guess-then-verify approach using a regular collision on MD5.
The number of necessary chosen challenges will be half-reduced.
The Detailed Attack Procedure
The procedure of our attack to recover one password character is as follows. Moreover, we give a pseudo-source code in Table 3. 1. Locate the free bit in the targeted password character, which divides the password character into 7-non-free bits and one free bit. 2. Recover the 7-non-free bits first. The attacker adopts the exhaustively guess-then-verify approach: guess the value of 7-non-free bits, then generate a pair of challenges, which will lead to a t-bit-free collision after being concatenated with the guess value, and finally send the pair of challenges to the user to check whether the responses collide or not. If the responses collide, the guess value is true. Otherwise, the guess value is wrong. There are in total 2 7 possible candidates for the 7-non-free bits, so (2 7 − 1) pairs of challenges are necessary in the worst case. 3. Recover the free bit by the guess-then-verify approach.
The attacker guess the free bit is '0', then generate a pair of challenges that leads to a regular collision, and finally sends the pair of challenges to check whether the responses collide or not. If the responses collide, then the guess is correct, which means the free bit is 0. Otherwise, the guess value is wrong, which means the Table 3 Our attack procedure. Denote by p r the password characters which have been recovered. Denote by p a password character which is going to be recovered. Note that the online work and offline work are parallel and independent.
Our procedure Our attack utilizes 1-bit-free collision. Set the bit position of the free bit in p, which will divide the p into two parts: 1-free bit and 7-non-free bits denoted as p f and p n f , respectively. For simplicity, we assume the 1-free bit locates at MSB of p.
Stage 1: recover the value of p n f .
-Chosen challenge collection (offline)
1. For p n f = 0000000 to 1111111 (7-non-free bits) 2. Generate a pair of challenges (C, C ): (C||p r ||p f ||p n f , C || p r ||p f ||p n f ) is a 1-bit-free collision. 3. Store (C, C , p n f ) to Table T . 4. End For -Impersonating as server (online)
If T is not NULL, then
3. Send C to the user to obtain the response R. 4. Send C to the user to obtain the response R . 5. If R = R , then the current value p n f is the true 7-nonfree bits of p. Stage 2: recover the value of p f .
1. Guess the 1-free bit is 0. 2. Generate a pair of challenges (C, C ) such that (C||p r ||0||p n f , C ||p r ||0||p n f ) is a collision. 3. Send C to the user to obtain the response R. 4. Send C to the user to obtain the response R . 5. If R = R , the value of p f is 0. Otherwise, the value is 1. 6. Halt the program. free bit is 1. So the free bit will be recovered by one pair of challenges. In the above procedure, the attacker will first recover the values of 7-non-free bits without the knowledge of the free bit, and then recover the value of the free bit. Totally (2 7 − 1 + 1) pairs of challenges are necessary in the worst case. The total number of necessary challenges has been approximately half-reduced compared to the previous attacks on APOP.
New Results of NMAC-MD5
First of all, we will reveal a new weakness of NMAC-MD5. Then based on this weakness, we will propose a new outerkey recovery attack on NMAC-MD5, which leads to a fullkey recovery attack on NMAC-MD5 by combining the previous inner-key recovery attack [4] . Finally we evaluate the complexity of our attack.
A New Weakness of NMAC-MD5
The input messages of the outer MD5 of NMAC-MD5 are the outputs of the inner MD5, which are 128-bit long and shorter than one block length (512 bits). Therefore the input messages of the outer MD5 function is only one message block after padded. Namely the outer MD5 is in fact md5(k 1 , ·). Recall md5 consists of a feed-forward operation: the output is the sum of initial value and the intermediate chaining value at the last step. As a result, the MAC value of NMAC-MD5 is the sum of the outer key k 1 and the intermediate chaining value at the 64-th step of the outer MD5. Hereafter we denote by ICV 64 the intermediate chaining value at 64-th step of the outer MD5 of NMAC-MD5 for simplicity.
Based on the above observation, one trivial attack approach is obtaining both MAC value and ICV 64 of a message, and then recovering the outer key k 1 . The attacker can send any message to NAMC oracle to get the corresponding MAC value. However it is not trivial to obtain ICV 64 for any message. We will solve this problem in the related-key setting: denote by MD5(k 1 , MD5(k 2 , ·)) the target NMAC oracle; and the attacker is given another NMAC oracle MD5( Our outer-key recovery attack adopts the same strategy to obtain the inside information of ICV 64 of some message, and then utilize it to recover the outer key.
Our Outer-Key Recovery Attack
Recall our attack is in the related-key setting: denote by MD5(k 1 , MD5(k 2 , ·)) the target NMAC oracle; the attacker is given another NMAC oracle MD5(k 1 31 , a bit carry from the 31-th bit to the 32-th bit either happens with a probability 1 or does not happen with a probability 1. More precisely, if k a,31 = 1 and h a,31 = 0, the bit carry happens with a probability 1. If k a,31 = 0 and h a,31 = 1, the bit carry does not happen with a probability 1. The same observation exists during the calculation h c = k c + c 64 .
Based on the above observation, we will illustrate our procedure of recovering k a,32∼31 and k c,32∼31 .
The Complexity of Recovering k a,i and k c
At step 1 of the attack procedure in Sect. 4.2.2, it roughly needs 2 77−i queries, since 2 46 , 2 30−(i+1)+1 and 2 queries are necessary to find a message satisfying conditions a), b) and c) respectively. The results of the step 2 is one of the two situations of step 3 with a probability 1 2 . Therefore, the step 1 will be repeated with a probability 1 2 . Suppose step 1 is repeated q times. The complexity of recovering k a,i will be q × 2 77−i with a success probability 1 − 2 −q . From 30-th bit until i-th bit, the total complexity is t=30 t=i q × 2 77−t < q × 2 78−i .
The Total Complexity
Finally we will evaluate the complexity of recovering full keys. The complexity of recovering k a,32∼31 and k c,32∼31 can be ignored compared with the complexity of recovering k a,i or k c,i , where i is small. We will pay attention to the complexity of recovering k a,i . Here we determine the value q to be 2 to obtain the low security bound of NMAC-MD5. Suppose we partially recover both k a and k c until i-th bit by online interacting with NMAC oracles. The number of the remaining unrecovered bit of k 1 is 65+2×i, which will be recovered by exhaustive offline computation. The offline complexity is 2 65+2×i MD5 computations. Following the evaluation of the total complexity in [4] , which is the sum of online queries and offline computations, the optimal bit position i should make the number of online queries equal to the number of offline MD5 computations: 2 65+2×i = 2 × 2 78−i + 2 × 2 78−i → i = 5.
Finally the complexity of our attack is 2 75 online queries and 2 75 offline MD5 computations.
Feedback to Practical Information Systems
The password recovery attack on APOP is practical. For example, the password has 6 characters. The attacker can obtain the first password character by using our attack procedure. One password character that most people use has 6 bits of entropy [7] . Following our attack, the number of necessary chosen challenges is just 32 in the worst case and 16 in the average case. The offline complexity of recovering the remaining 5 characters is at most 2 40 MD5 computations, which takes less than a single day by using 10 PCs. APOP has been adopted by several practical mail systems such as Mozilla Thunderbird. An countermeasure that Mozailla Thunderbird adopts now is restricting the challenges to be ASCII texts. This countermeasure has two advantages: a) it is computationally infeasible to generate ASCII colliding messages on MD5 so far; b) the expense is little. However, with the increase of the computational power of the computers and the development of the attack techniques on MD5, the security of this countermeasure in the coming few years is very suspicious in our opinion. We suggest that those systems based on APOP should update their underlying MD5 to a more secure hash function. One candidate is SHA-2.
The key-recovery attack on NMAC-MD5 is still just a theoretical result. Therefore, the security of both NMAC-MD5 and HMAC-MD5 is not damaged. However, considering the increase of computational power, the hash digest of MD5, which is 128 bits, seems relatively short. We recommend that the related information systems should update HMAC-MD5 to HMAC-SHA-1, or HMAC based on more secure hash functions than SHA-1.
